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Decision making has been regarded as the last stage before action in the human information processing, certainly subsequent to
sensory sampling and perceptual integration. Our latest study showed that orienting contributes to preference decision making, by
integrating preferential looking and mere exposure in a positive feedback loop leading to the conscious choice. Here, we introduce a
gaze-contingent window method of stimulus presentation into our experimental paradigm, to completely block holistic stimulus process-
ing while preserving piecemeal sampling through the gaze-contingent ‘‘peephole’’. This eﬀectively zooms the visual processing in time
domain, allowing us to show that orienting and decision making can interact long before the actual conscious choice. The ﬁnding also
suggests that this interaction is independent of holistic properties of face stimuli and can be totally memory-driven.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Eye-movements; Gaze; Preference; Decision making; Gaze-contingent displays; Face perception; Face attractiveness; Orienting behavior1. Introduction
The orienting reﬂex is an automated redirection of atten-
tion towards anunexpected stimulus (Sokolov, 1963).Devel-
oped as a novelty detection mechanism, it provides the basis
for the entire orienting behavior, whose components are no
longer automatic and whose scope goes far beyond a ﬁght-
or-ﬂight reaction. The behavior itself has recently been
attributed active roles in high-level social as well as cognitive
functions, such as mate selection (Hauser & Agnetta et al.,
1998), recognition of emotions (Adolphs & Gosselin et al.,
2005), and preference decision making (Shimojo & Simion
et al., 2003). In many species, the mate selection ritual starts
with orienting towards the potential partner, and in humans
it is well known that gaze contact expresses interest or desire
to collaborate (Emery, 2000;Kleinke, 1986). These examples
depart from the classic view that orienting strictly equals
attention focusing, but there is little experimental data indi-0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.visres.2006.04.019
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: claudiu@caltech.edu (C. Simion).cating how orienting can participate in higher-level mental
functions.
In a past study (Shimojo & Simion et al., 2003), we
showed that gaze assists the brain in making a decision,
especially in preference tasks. Speciﬁcally, we noticed that,
while comparing two stimuli for attractiveness, observers’
increasingly biased their gaze towards the eventual choice,
the closer to the conscious decision they were. Moreover,
we showed that manipulating gaze can inﬂuence observers’
preference. A simple model linked orienting to decision
making, using phenomena well-described in the literature:
mere exposure eﬀect (Kunstwilson & Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc,
1968), and preferential looking, (Fantz, 1964). Note that, in
natural situations, active gaze shift can mediate both, so
the more we look at a stimulus, the more we like it and
the more we like it, the more we tend to look at it. The
illustration of this positive feedback loop was a continually
increasing gaze bias towards choice during preference
tasks, which we called the ‘‘gaze cascade eﬀect’’.
Thus, we proposed that orienting is not merely a means
for gathering relevant information, but also as an active
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fast connections between gaze control areas (frontal eye
ﬁelds, LIP, Shipp, 2004) and decision structures (prefrontal
cortex, Fellows & Farah, 2005) or even face/object percep-
tion (inferior temporal cortex, Sigala & Logothetis, 2002)
and memory (hippocampus, Corkin, 2002) areas, as well
as feedback ﬁbers gathering information necessary to
update and control gaze position and duration.
In the present study, we introduced a new method of
stimulus presentation in our experimental paradigm, which
prevented holistic stimulus perception, while allowing
piecemeal, feature perception. Speciﬁcally, subjects could
inspect pairs of human faces through a small gaze-contin-
gent window (‘‘peephole’’, Fig. 1) while they compared
them for attractiveness or roundness. Gaze-contingent dis-
plays allow only a narrow foveal view, and have been
extensively used (Rayner, 1998) in experiments involving
reading (McConkie & Rayner, 1975), scene perception,
visual search (Bertera & Rayner, 2000; Pomplun & Rein-
gold et al., 2001; Saida & Ikeda, 1979), and even face rec-
ognition. Usually, these studies investigated the inﬂuence
of perceptual span (controlled by the size of the window)
on subjects’ performance in the respective tasks. The gener-
al consensus is that smaller windows decrease either perfor-
mance or reaction time, a result which we will treat as a
given herein. Presenting the stimuli in this particular way
in our study serves three purposes: (a) it makes the judg-
ment (preference or control) more diﬃcult, allowing analy-
sis over a more extended period of time, (b) decouples
orienting from diagnostic stimulus features that might act
as attention grabbers, rendering its control to internal fac-
tors such as intention and memory and (c) eliminates the
potential contribution of an initial holistic assessment of
the entire stimulus to the preference decision.
With regard to (c) above, our initial demonstration
(Shimojo & Simion et al., 2003) relied on the presence ofFig. 1. An example of what observers could see through the gaze-
contingent window. Note that only a small portion of the display is visible
at any moment in time, although the general areas occupied by the faces
are indicated through the rectangles to aid the observers in their search.holistic visual stimuli. It was therefore unclear whether
the connection between orienting and preference would still
exist without it. Moreover, since we allowed subjects to
choose the more attractive stimulus without imposing any
restrictions, the average reaction time analyzed was around
3 s, of which only the last second represented the gaze bias
eﬀect. Thus, assessing how early in the visual processing the
orienting behavior intervenes was diﬃcult because of possi-
ble confounds, such as selection bias or stimulus-locking by
gaze, all factors being jammed together in a small temporal
window before the subject’s response.
The diﬃculty of the tasks in the new setup would enable
us to zoom the decision process in time domain, reassess-
ing, with better temporal resolution, the contribution of
orienting to preference formation while the whole stimulus
is never shown, but sampling and integration of local visual
information is on-going. If the gaze behavior bears similar-
ities with what we observed in the full-stimulus tasks (i.e.,
the existence of a ‘‘cascade eﬀect’’), we would consider it
direct evidence of orienting as being embedded in the mech-
anism of preference decision making, since now the behav-
ior would be entirely separated from its attention-grabbing
purpose.
Finally, many studies make a distinction between the
overt choice, expressed usually through a button press or
verbal report, and the decision, which is assumed to be
internal (Schall, 2001). However, in this study, we will fol-
low the deployment of the orienting behavior and its con-
nections to what we call the decision process, lasting
from the stimulus onset to the moment of response.
2. Results
The stimuli used in this study consisted of pairs of
computer-generated human faces (www.facegen.com),
hidden behind a blank screen. Using Eyelink2 (www.
eyelinkinfo.com) we deﬁned a small, circular gaze-contin-
gent window through which observers could inspect the
display underneath, as if looking through a ‘‘peephole’’.
The size of the window was set so that only one feature
(e.g., eye, nose, mouth, and ear) of a face was visible at
any point in time. Observers had to choose the more attrac-
tive face (main task) or the rounder face (control task).
Observers’ gaze position was sampled and for each time
t, we calculated the likelihood that gaze was directed to the
face eventually chosen, as described in Shimojo and Simion
et al., 2003 (see Section 4 for details). Average decision
times were 35.1 ± 20.4 s for the attractiveness task and
29.3 ± 15.4 s for the roundness task. The last 14 s (approx.
mean RT minus 1 standard deviation) were included in the
gaze likelihood analysis. For comparison, we mention that
in our previous study decision times were one order of
magnitude shorter in the full-stimulus experiments (3–4 s)
and only the last 2.5 s were included in the analysis. We
view this diﬀerence between decision times as a ‘‘time lens’’
through which we can examine with better resolution the
inﬂuence of gaze on preference formation.
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plotted against time until decision, in the preference (A)
and roundness (B) tasks. A level close to 50% means that
the two faces were equally probable to be inspected. Any
consistent and signiﬁcant abatement above this level illus-
trates a gaze bias towards choice. The curves are the aver-
age of N = 7 (A) or N = 4 (B) subjects over N = 30 trials
each. To estimate the start point of a gaze bias, we used
a signiﬁcance threshold method (see Section 4). The ‘‘cas-
cade’’ start point was deﬁned as the time when the curve
passed this threshold and never returned at or below it.
As predicted by our claim that orienting contributes to
preference decision making, a ‘‘gaze cascade eﬀect’’ occurs
in the preference task. While the magnitude (maximum
height 84%) is comparable with the ones in the full-stimu-
lus tasks (approx. 85%; Shimojo & Simion et al., 2003), the
duration of the eﬀect stands out when a gaze-contingentFig. 2. The likelihood that observers’ gaze was directed towards the
eventual choice is plotted against time before decision, in the attractiveness
(A) and roundness (B) tasks. The last 14 s of each trial were analyzed. The
solid lines represent the 4-parameter sigmoid ﬁts of the raw-data (dots).
The sigmoid ﬁt from (A) is replotted in B (dashed line) for comparison.
The corresponding signiﬁcance thresholds for each task are also plotted,
and are variable because of changes in sample size due to blinks, saccades
or trials shorter than 14 s.window is used. The curve starts to signiﬁcantly depart
from the 50% zone with around 7.5 s before decision, much
earlier than the 800–1200 ms we computed in our original
study. In contrast, in the roundness task the gaze bias starts
less than 1 s before decision and its amplitude is signiﬁcant-
ly smaller (75%). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test conﬁrmed
that the two curves are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (dKS = 2.89,
p < 0.0001).
3. Discussion
The main result of this paper is that a gaze cascade eﬀect
accompanies preference, but not control decision making in
the gaze-contingent ‘‘peephole’’ experiment. It is notable
that the entire eﬀect was elongated in time domain, with its
onsetmore than 7 s before decision. Ifwe assume, as in Shim-
ojo andSimion et al. (2003), that the cascade eﬀect is the illus-
tration of an interaction between orienting and preference
decision making, this study shows that such interactions
can arise relatively early in the information processing
stream and strengthens our claim that orienting is a intrinsic
component in the process of choosing preference.
Additionally, a few alternative explanations for this
eﬀect are rebutted in this study. First, the selection bias
account, proposing that subjects tend to dwell on the
(already chosen) stimulus for the last ﬁxation, is invalidat-
ed by the diﬀerence in the onset of gaze cascade (7.4 s vs.
0.8 s) between the preference and the control tasks. Such
an account would predict a gaze bias of relatively short
duration and locked to the point of decision regardless of
task. The result obtained in the preference task is way
too long. Second, the necessity of a holistic matching of
the visual display with an internal representation template
for the gaze bias to occur is eliminated. Since holistic
matching is not available at any point during the experi-
ments reported here, this setup emphasizes the decoupling
between orienting and the presence of visual stimulation.
Third, there is a possibility that an ‘‘internal decision’’ is
made before the start of the gaze bias, which only reﬂects
further sampling of ‘‘evidence’’ for reconﬁrmation. To be
consistent with our results, the reconﬁrmation account
must assume that the roundness control needs minimal to
no reconﬁrmation, while the attractiveness task needs 6–
7 s, being a more diﬃcult task. Instead of trying to discount
such interpretation, we remind the reader that our claim is
that orienting is intrinsically involved in the entire process
leading to the ﬁnal conscious preference choice, which may
include ‘‘recruiting additional evidence’’. Even in that case,
the reconﬁrmation account may encounter a hard
challenge in establishing the exact moment of the internal
decision, which is beyond the point of this investigation.
Overall, our results add to earlier evidence that choosing
what we like is unique relative to other tasks in its intrinsic
dependency on orienting. The process of making an overt
preference choice is accompanied by the preceding gaze
cascade eﬀect even when orienting is mainly internally
driven.
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through a small gaze-contingent window very diﬃcult,
especially with faces, traditionally known as holistic
stimuli. Our ‘‘peephole’’ method is in some ways simi-
lar to Bubbles (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001), in that it
drastically limits the amount of visual information that
observers have available at any point in time. While
Bubbles is very successful at determining what stimulus
features are important for various perception tasks
(e.g., face perception, Smith & Cottrell et al., 2005),
the peephole setup enables ﬁner temporal control over
what can be perceived. It eﬀectively acts as a temporal
zoom lens allowing us to reveal through psychophysics
the time course of the interactions between orienting,
visual processing and decision making. Similar to the
authors of Bubbles, we take as given that internal rep-
resentations, short-term memory and task-speciﬁc inten-
tions, rather than stimulus visual features, play a
crucial role in the completion of the tasks presented
herein. Nevertheless the gaze bias, reinforced through
positive feedback, drives the preference decision to
completion in the same manner as it did in the previ-
ous, full-stimulus tasks.
It is in particular noteworthy that our subjects could
have done the preference task the same way as the
roundness task (i.e., spatial and sensory sampling ﬁrst,
then decision), but they did not. Instead, while the brain
was still recruiting local information across ﬁxations, the
gaze cascade had already started and was developing,
showing that the orienting bias overlaps temporally with
the visual sampling. Based on the qualitative similarity of
the gaze bias dynamics, except for the onset timing, we
speculate that essentially the same interaction happens
in the ordinary observation conditions, but the short
decision times make its illustration more diﬃcult. The
results presented herein form in our view stronger evi-
dence that the gaze is intrinsically involved in preference
decision making.
In cognitive and psychological domains, our ﬁndings
are in good aﬃnity with the view of ‘‘self’’ as an other
(Bem, 1967), as well as with the somatic marker hypoth-
esis (Bechara & Damasio et al., 2000; Damasio, 1996).
Common among them is the general claim that one often
needs to observe and to cognitively interpret one’s own
behavior in order to generate emotion, which in turn
aﬀects judgment. As for more general implications, the
present work puts orienting in the category of active,
self-sustaining behaviors, which can be incorporated in
more complex and dynamic processes and separates it
from the presence of attention grabbers in the environ-
ment. Our results also supports recent, parallel and
dynamic models of the brain, in which sensory experi-
ence and higher-level brain functions such as emotional
valence or decision making share fast reciprocal connec-
tions, continually inﬂuencing each other from very early
on in the perceptual processing.4. Experimental procedures
Pairs of images of human faces were placed on a CRT computer
screen. The images were 480 · 480 pixel JPEG ﬁles, subtending 16 · 16
degrees of visual ﬁeld, and were located on the horizontal midline of the
computer screen and of the observers’ ﬁeld of view, and at equal distance
left and right from the vertical midline. A blank screen was initially cov-
ering the images, with square frames clearly indicating the location of
the face images underneath.
Using the on-line eye-tracking capability of EyeLink2 (SR Research,
www.eyelinkinfo.com), we created a gaze-contingent setup in which
observers were revealed the portion of the underlying display that they
chose to foveate. A small, circular 75 pixel diameter (2.5 degrees of visual
angle) gaze-contingent window was visible at any given time. The very
short delay of the Eyelink2 system (<3 ms) in transmitting data from
the eye-tracking software back into the experimental setup ensured the
contingency of whatever could be viewed to the observers’ foveal vision.
Eleven naı¨ve, healthy observers (Caltech undergraduate and graduate
students) were run in this experiment after their written consent was
obtained. They were paid $5 for the experiment. The task was to inspect
both faces hidden under the blank screen and decide which one was more
attractive (N = 7, attractiveness task) or rounder (N = 4, roundness task).
The response was recorded with a corresponding button press for either
the left or the right face. As mentioned, the observers could never see more
than a circular 2.5 degree portion of the face image at any time, ensuring
that only piecemeal perception of the stimuli could occur.
Eye-movements were tracked with the EyeLink2 system at 500 MHz,
pupil reﬂection mode. Head movements were compensated for and we per-
formed calibration before the experiment, as well as drift correction prior
to each trial. Each experimental condition consisted of N = 30 trials. Eye
movement data analysis was performed and the likelihood curve was com-
puted as described in Shimojo and Simion et al., 2003. Since the data
points contained in the likelihood curves were averages over binary values
(0 and 1), we determined, for each sampling point t, the maximum prob-
ability value at which a coin would be considered fair with 95 percent con-
ﬁdence, given a number of tosses equal to the number of trials averaged at
that sampling point. We called this the ‘‘signiﬁcance threshold’’. The cas-
cade eﬀect was deﬁned as that increasing part of the likelihood curve that
irreversibly rose above this threshold. The time at which the bias started
and the maximum likelihood just prior to the button press were considered
signiﬁcant parameters for comparing the eﬀect in the two present condi-
tions, as well as in our past experiments.
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